Rewards for Ratification?
The new article Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/isqu.12142/epdf) by Richard A. Nielsen and Beth A. Simmons presents empirical data strongly contesting the hypothesis that states reward other states for human rights treaty ratification. They contend that neither tangible, material rewards like aid nor intangible benefits like belonging, praise, acceptance, respect or inclusion motivate ratification decisions. This paper, published in International Studies Quarterly, should be of particular interest to our readers because the authors suggest studying alternate reasons states choose to ratify human rights treaties.
Many of these theories could help guide advocates in trying to bring human rights home. In particular, Nielson & Simmons point to Andrew Moravcsik’s theory that human rights treaties are “useful for domestic political objectives; they help sustain democratic momentum and lock in fairly recent rights gains.” They also suggest looking to Thomas Risse and Katherine Sikkink’s spiral model that views ratification as “a tactical concession to rights proponents at both the domestic and international levels.”
U.S. advocates urging the domestic ratification of treaties like the Convention on the Ratification of the Child, the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities might consider whether this study suggests new strategies for reframing the ratification push. While the United States is not similarly positioned to most other non-ratifying states in its need for tangible assistance or perhaps intangible rewards like respect and acceptance, it is worth thinking through whether they are similarly positioned in terms of domestic political objectives.